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Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
A mixed bag dominated by H & D's reductionist nonsense. This is a 
follow-up to Hofstadter´s famous (or infamous as I would now say, 
considering its unrelenting nonsense) Godel, Escher, Bach (1980). Like its 
predecessor, it is concerned largely with the foundations of artificial 
intelligence, but it is composed mostly of stories, essays and extracts from 
a wide range of people, with a few essays by DH and DD and comments 
to all of the contributions by one or the other of them. For my views on 
the attempts of D and H to understand behavior see my review of 
Hofstadter's  ‘I am a Strange Loop’ and other writings. 
 
Much of it is very reductionistic in tone (i.e., " explains " everything in 
terms of physics/math and denies " reality " of psychology) but as 
Hofstadter notes, the quantum field equations of a water molecule are too 
complex to solve (and so is a vacuum)and nobody has a clue about how 
to explain the way properties emerge (e.g., water properties from H2 and 
02) as you go up the scale from the vacuum to the brain, so reductionism, 
like holism, requires a great deal of faith and in fact is incoherent as one 
cannot even frame it's arguments without presupposing the coherence of 
higher order thought. Additional problems for reductionism are the 
uncertainty principle, chaos (e.g., no way to predict how a pile of sand 
will fall), the logically necessary incompleteness of math (and all thought) 
and the impossibility of matching higher order behaviors (e.g., language) 
with lower order phenomena (e.g., biochemistry), i.e., the combinatorial 
explosion or underdetermination. In sum, though there are many 
interesting comments, like nearly all writing on behavior, this work lacks 
any coherent account of the logical structure of rationality, which I try to 
give in my writings. 
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Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my 
writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, 
Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 
3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
 
 
 
This book is a very mixed bag, dominated by H & D's reductionist 
nonsense. This is a follow-up to Hofstadter´s famous (or infamous, 
considering its unrelenting nonsense) Godel, Escher, Bach (1980). Like its 
predecessor, it is concerned largely with the foundations of artificial 
intelligence, but it is composed mostly of stories, essays and extracts from 
a wide range of people, with a few essays by DH and DD and comments 
to all of the contributions by one or the other of them. For my views on 
the attempts of D and H to understand behavior see my review of 
Hofstadter's  ‘I am a Strange Loop’ and other writings.  
 
Much of it is very reductionistic in tone (i.e., " explains " everything in 
terms of physics/math and denies " reality " of psychology), but as 
Hofstadter notes, the quantum field equations of a water molecule are too 
complex to solve (and so is a vacuum)and nobody has a clue about how 
to explain the way properties emerge (e.g., water properties from H2 and 
02) as you go up the scale from the vacuum to the brain, so reductionism, 
like holism, requires a great deal of faith and in fact is incoherent as one 
cannot even frame it's arguments without presupposing the coherence of 
higher order thought (mind, language, psychology). Additional problems 
for reductionism are the uncertainty principle, chaos (e.g., no way to 
predict how a pile of sand will fall and chaos theory itself has been shown 
to be both undecidable and incomplete), the logically necessary 
incompleteness of math (and all thought) and the impossibility of 
matching higher order behaviors (e.g., language) with lower order 
 3 
 
phenomena (e.g., biochemistry), i.e., the combinatorial explosion or 
underdetermination. See my other writing for discussion of 
‘undecidibility’, ‘incompleteness’, ‘emergence’, ‘reduction’ etc. In sum, 
though there are many interesting comments, like nearly all writing on 
behavior, this work lacks any coherent account of the logical structure of 
rationality, which I try to give in my writings. 
 
Like all books - yes I  do mean all, this can be usefully viewed as a 
psychology text, though none of the authors realize this. It is about human 
behavior and reasoning—about why we think and act the way we do. But 
(like all such discussion until recently), none of the ’explanations’ are 
really explanations (and not even descriptions) of what we are interested 
in (higher order behavior of linguistic System 2).  People are not clear 
about separating the ‘mental mechanisms’ involved, which can be 
neurophysiological (System 1 and biochemistry) or psychological (System 
2).  In fact, like most ´explanations` of behavior the texts here and the 
comments by DH and DD are often more interesting for what kinds of 
things they accept (and omit) as ‘explanations’ than for the actual content. 
As with all reasoning and explaining, one now wants to know which of 
the brain’s
 
inference engines are activated to produce the authors biases 
and results. It is the relevance filters which determine what sorts of things 
we can accept as appropriate data for each inference engine and their 
automatic and unconscious operation and interaction that determines 
what we can accept as an answer. This is standard terminology from 
evolutionary psychology so if that’s not familiar you may wish to do some 
reading. I recommend Buss’s “Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology 2nd 
ed” and the newest edition of his text on EP, and Boyer’s “Religion 
Explained”, which I have also reviewed. 
 
Cognitive and evolutionary psychology are still not evolved enough to 
provide full explanations (though following Wittgenstein we should say 
“descriptions”), but an interesting start has been made. Boyer´s  
`Religion Explained` is one of half a dozen books that show what a 
modern scientific description of religion looks like.  Pinker´s `How the 
mind Works` is a good general survey.  
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We now recognize that art, music, math, language and religion are all 
results of the automatic functioning of the inference engines (System 1) as 
embellished by linguistic System 2 (see my other writings for details). This 
is why we can expect similarities and puzzles and inconsistencies or 
incompleteness and often, dead ends. It is now the dominant view that 
the brain has no general intelligence, but numerous specialized modules 
or inference engines (System 1 reflexes), each of which works on certain 
aspects of some problem and the results are then added. Hofstadter, like 
everyone, can only generate or recognize explanations that are consistent 
with the operations of his own inference engines, which were evolved to 
deal with such things as resource accumulation, coalitions in small 
groups, social exchanges and the evaluation of the intentions of other 
persons. It is amazing they can produce art or music or math and not 
surprising that figuring out how they themselves work together to 
produce overall intelligence or consciousness or choice is way beyond 
reach nearly 40 years later. 
 
The article on Turing (and many others) left me thinking- ´Oh where is 
Wittgenstein when we need him! ´ Turing attended W´s lectures on the 
foundations of math but he did not understand the most basic points (not 
surprising, as few have even to this day). As W so famously said, decades 
before this book was written--`Philosophy is the battle against the 
bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language`(or we might now 
say by the brain´s inference engines) and it is a battle that H and D have 
lost. Wittgenstein is one of the most original and influential thinkers of all 
time and commented incisively on all the major issues in this book, but 
there no awareness of this in the writings of either of them. He explained 
in detail how the language games of simulation (e.g., Turing test of 
computer thinking), imitation, pretense, belief, etc., are parasitic on 
innately programmed reflexes which then lead to the public acts of 
knowing and understanding. We are told (p94) that we ´believe´ in other 
minds (try disbelieving—e.g., look at your child or even your dog and 
think ‘this is just a robot’, or imagine you step on its foot and it howls and 
you think it’s doing that for the same reason noise comes out of the radio 
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when you turn it on), and that we treat others as black boxes--- but only 
the mentally ill or  autistic do that (ask yourself how we know that). It is 
only computers that we treat as black boxes and about which we might 
have beliefs concerning their interior processes. H stopped writing such 
books after this one until his recent disaster ‘I am a Strange Loop’ (see my 
review), but D continues to this day (2019) to produce treatises full of the 
same basic confusions (as do thousands of others).  
 
By far the best philosophical article in the book is John Searle´s famous 
`Minds, Brains and Programs` in which he introduces the Chinese room 
argument, which shows why computer programs don´t think (NOT why 
they cannot ever be designed to think--he continues to point out to this 
day that WE can be regarded as examples of computing devices that 
think—i.e., in my terms the language games of ‘computing’, ‘machine’, 
‘think’ etc. can be applied to us). DD and DH offer superficial and 
arrogant criticisms, but Searle is now widely regarded as a top living 
philosopher and the Chinese room is probably the most famous new 
philosophical debate since Wittgenstein’s arguments against private 
language, solipsism, etc. and of course Wittgenstein was the first to 
discuss in detail all these basic language games of mind and machine (see 
e.g., Gefwert,  Proudfoot etc.). It would have saved them alot of 
embarrassment if they had just offered to let Searle coedit the book, or at 
least rebut their comments. 
 
Nagel´s lovely `What is it like to be a bat` shows that we don´t have any 
idea what an answer is like, nor how to even try to find one.  In this 
respect, it’s quite similar to Searle´s comments on AI--nobody to this day 
has any idea what a program mimicking ’thinking’ would be like, nor 
even how to go about making one and Wittgenstein showed us the 
subtleties of the language game of ‘thinking’ and other dispositional verbs 
as I describe in detail in my recent writings.  
 
 Some say neural nets and fuzzy logic are like the brain, but what is the 
evidence? And again there are just more language games. Searle has made 
similar comments in his criticisms of those like Dennett, who claim to 
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explain consciousness (e.g., see `The Mystery of Consciousness`) and the 
same applies to free will, causality, perception etc. So far as I can see, 
neither this book nor GEB, nor any of their others, further the study of 
mind, in the sense of the descriptive psychology of higher order thought, 
in any way.  See my quotes from P.M.S. Hacker elsewhere for congruent 
thoughts of the most eminent Wittgensteinian. We did not then and do 
not now (i.e., 25 years after this book was published) know how to 
scientifically conceptualize thinking (or consciousness, uncertainty, 
entanglement, wave/particle duality, free will etc.)—i.e., how to play the 
language games using these words, nor even how to recognize what such 
an ‘explanatory’ concept (i.e., a satisfactory language game with clear 
Conditions of Satisfaction--COS) would be. But DD and DH did not get 
the point then, nor subsequently. 
 
DH has new (since GEB) speculations on how music, art, math and 
programs may map onto each other but they don´t   go anywhere. He 
has some new Q & A sessions, so extensively used in GEB, but they leave 
only questions and on the key issue of how programs might be like 
thinking, the only convincing reply is that of Searle--we don´t even know 
how to conceptualize the difference (I would say how to decide to play 
the language games). So, DH winds up just as lost as DD `Maybe, just 
like beauty, the sound `I` denotes nothing at all` (p456). If ´I´ means 
nothing then by the same criteria (refusal to accept the normal 
meaning—i.e., the COS) so do all other words. DD says the Chinese room 
aims to refute materialism and that it fails as an argument because the 
room is too slow--both clearly untrue. And now, after over 40 years of 
philosophizing (e.g., in `Consciousness Explained` and in `Freedom 
Evolves`) and his most recent work ‘From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The 
Evolution of Minds (2018)’, he repeats the same mistakes that 
Wittgenstein pointed out over 80 years ago. 
 
We ought to consider it extremely odd that any philosopher should think 
he can answer empirical questions. Thinking, feeling, perceiving, 
choosing, etc. are phenomena of the world like any others and we can 
investigate them in various ways. But how can anyone investigate them 
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by thinking? A philosopher cannot answer questions about genetics, 
chemistry or physics, but when it comes to the realm of mind, 
consciousness, perception, free will, causality, reality, they feel qualified-
-why? Like all behavior, we now look at the operations of the inference 
engines to see why they make us think like this. Is it the operations of the 
intuitive psychology and social mind engines that forces them to deny the 
reality of the very things they are investigating (e.g., thinking, 
consciousness, choice)? As Wittgenstein often said our language lacks 
clarity so we can say anything but we cannot mean anything except in 
very specific contexts.  
 
H makes a glaringly stupid remark --comparing LSD effects to a bullet 
through the brain (p412). By 1981 millions of people had taken LSD and 
there were hundreds of books and thousands of articles and numerous 
films showing that it was precisely its ability to specifically trigger 
emotions, memories, images, intellectual and visual fantasies etc., that 
gives it such great therapeutic power and interest. If he had taken 
psychedelics it might have freed him from wasting his life spouting 
nonsense.  
 
They attempt (p403) an explanation of mirror reversal, but in spite of this 
and Ned Block´s article (J. Phil p259-77. 1974) and even one by Feynman, 
I think the only complete explanation is that found in the book and article 
by British psychologist Richard Gregory. 
 
Because of the wide range of famous writers represented, this book is still 
well worth reading. Where else can you find Turing, Searle´s Chinese 
room, Nagel’s famous `What is it like to be a bat? ` and several xlnt 
selections from Sci Fi writer Stanislaw Lem? 
 
Perhaps the bottom line here is that 25 years of research in AI and 
programming by tens of thousands of people with billions of dollars have 
failed to produce a program that can perceive and respond in general 
contexts with them abilities of a 3 monthold baby, or a robot with the 
realworld intelligence of an ant, though recently there have been huge 
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advances. Cognitive psychology is slowly exposing the inference engines 
that make it possible and one day, probably, we can mimic them with a 
program. Even so, it is not clear we will find it useful to call it thinking. 
The problem is that almost nobody in this book has a clue about how 
language (largely equivalent to mind, as Wittgenstein made clear) works 
and so they just repeat the errors of 2500 years of philosophy. 
 
See my recent review of Ray Kurzweil’s ‘How to Create a Mind’, which 
provides an update on this discussion.   
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